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Challenge of presenting psychiatrist’s view of biology is provoking and difficult. 
Some years ago, with Bogdan de Barbaro [ 1 ] trying to present a portrait of psychiatry, 
we came to conclusions that the task is unrealistic. Psychiatry has been changing and 
developing in too many directions. Nevertheless, psychiatrists have no doubts their 
discipline belongs to the domain of medicine. However, other physicians still perceive 
psychiatry as enigmatic, mysterious and being far from science.
Precise description of the subject of psychiatry is not an easy task. Lucjan Korze­
niowski [2] gave a descriptive definition of psychiatry: “a branch of medicine, whose 
subject is mental illnesses. Covers their aetiology, pathophysiology and pathogenesis, 
symptomathology, clinical aspects and treatment. In its theoretical and practical search 
psychiatry uses achievements of neurology, neurophysiology, genetics, biochemistry, 
anthropology, psychopharmacology, sociology, psychology and many philosophical 
interpretations... In contemporary psychiatry one can see development of many, to 
some extent independent sub-disciplines ... Problems of psychiatric prophylactics, 
especially in their social and educational aspects are dealt with by mental hygiene.” 
The definition was written for the Polish dictionary of psychiatry. Authors of the next 
dictionary abstained from the approach to define psychiatry at all [3], Korzeniowski’s 
definition is important as it indicates a great number of sciences concerned on human 
being that psychiatry needs and uses. Even if it cannot be regarded as satisfactory (the 
term “mental illness” postponed since the time it was constructed [4]), it does not enlist 
biology among sciences useful for psychiatry. But, Korzeniowski put at the first posi-
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tion neurology, a medical discipline psychiatry emancipated from, and now seems to 
be coming back to it. He also named disciplines, which developed from biology. Since 
the time the definition was edited the number of such scientific disciplines has grown 
up, to mention psychoimmunology and above all neuroscience only. Korzeniowski 
listed another group of disciplines psychiatry uses: anthropology, sociology, psychol­
ogy and philosophy. In such a way reflected a dichotomy in psychiatry: of biological 
and humanistic orientation. The dichotomy noticed in the 1930’s by Jakub Frostig: 
“Appearance of psychiatry has completely changed. Biological and psychological 
parts have developed. Both, yet unknown to each other today, often claim the right 
to solve psychiatric problems. In spite of this efforts aiming at integration of varying 
approaches become more and more often [5]. So, the hope to overcome dichotomy in 
psychiatry is nothing new. However, after three-quarters of a century it does not seem 
the efforts in integrating varying approaches brought the fruits hoped for.
Is this integration purposeful? It seems that what is worth the efforts is mutual 
interest of psychiatrists’ of both orientations in their ways of problem formulation 
and achievements. State of knowledge in psychiatry can only profit from this. Such 
integration could be perceived as a process. The final solution of all questions mental 
disorders provoke us to, seems to belong to omnipotent dreams.
On the other side one should remember, that the development of psychiatry “to­
wards biological orientation” and “towards psychological orientation” reflects the 
basic discussion characteristic for our culture. Human mind and human behaviour 
have been approached with the essential question on identity of mental and physical 
phenomena [6, 7].
It should be also remembered, that psychiatry, a clinical discipline, has not elabo­
rated its own scientific methodology. In its own research relies on methodology devel­
oped by natural and humanistic sciences. Nowadays, with significant achievements in 
biology, looking for adequate methods turns rather towards the last one than towards 
psychology or cultural anthropology. Psychiatric psychopathology and nosography de­
veloped through the 19th century, as it seems, have been used to their limits. Psychiatry 
is looking for new solutions. An example can be presumptions forming a background 
of new classification of mental disorders in DSM-IV [8].
Psychiatry efforts to become a scientific discipline
Descriptive background of psychiatry formed on valuable observations and ex­
plorations prove their usefulness in everyday clinical practice: in diagnostic process, 
expertise formulation, and in treatment. Nevertheless, conceptualisations of mental 
disorders based on this background appeared to be insufficient. They failed to give 
satisfactory explanation of abundance and variety of experiences of those who are 
diagnosed as mentally disturbed. The very existence of mental disorders cannot be 
questioned, nevertheless psychiatrists’ opinions on the disturbance in a given person 
very often are incongruent. There is also a risky possibility of arbitrary declaration 
that given phenomenon is, or is not, a mental disorder. Let a Soviet concept of “white 
schizophrenia ” [9] be an example. Yet another is the position on homosexuality which
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lost the status of a disorder. Or, cultural criteria included as necessary to diagnose for 
example possession [10, 11], It can be easily understood that psychiatrists would like 
to rely in their diagnostic process on the criteria more measurable and harder than be­
haviour observation, subjective patient relation on her/his experiences, or observation 
and analysis of their own experiences in relation with the patient.
The hope for such measurable and solid criteria seems to be achieved in the way 
analogue to that developed in somatic medicine, in the way of finding measures -  
biological in nature and difficult to question. The goal would be to find a standardised 
measure of some substance, or its dynamics -  proved to be pathognomic for mental 
disorder! Or an image of a structure of a body part, or pattern of function, proved to 
have the same properties! Well such an understanding of biology failed to fulfil psy­
chiatrists’ hopes. Except for mental disorders in Syphilis none were given biological 
diagnostic measure. But experience with mental disorders in Syphilis taught psychiatry 
that establishing a solid relation between infection, biochemical and immunological 
measures, and presence of specific psychopathological symptoms gave spectacular 
results. Introduction of early antibiotic treatment after infection led to successful pre­
vention of its late mental symptoms and sent sophisticated descriptions of paralysis 
progressiva to the history of psychiatry [12]. But the history of paralysis progressiva 
pushes forward a question of the meaning of psychopathological analysis. The descrip­
tion of various clinical manifestations of the disorder, nor its dynamics did not bring 
psychiatrists closer to effective treatment and prevention methods. On the other side 
discovery of bacterial infection as the causal factor and finding of effective antibiotic 
therapy did not explain the variety of symptomathology of the disorder.
Contemporary efforts in research on schizophrenia bring an impression of simi­
larity. Official psychiatric bodies declare a consensus on a multifactorial, complex 
character of schizophrenia group disorders. Nevertheless, psychiatrists have been 
busy looking for the only one, the most important cause of the disorder for decades. 
In the last decades this cause to be found is expected to be of biological nature. These 
are fascinating studies. Their results are fascinating too. The body of knowledge of 
the functioning of the brain, metabolism of substances engaged in its functioning, 
metabolism of neurones, complicated ways of information processing in the brain has 
been gathered thanks to these efforts.
The problem the science puts is in the necessity of precise formulation of the 
subject of the studies. It appeared that the diagnostic system developed by psychiatry 
through the decades, effective for the treatment and care with a feeling of competency, 
has to be changed to enable a selection of similar, comparable “research objects”. 
Research demands rigorous and objective criteria for disorders still diagnosed when 
particular psychopathological symptoms -  mental and behavioural phenomena -  are 
identified.
The psychiatrist is confronted with the new problem: is the phenomenon being the 
subject of scientific studies the same, which is experienced by his patient?
Is scientifically oriented psychiatry loosing something?
Antoni Kępiński [13] warned psychiatry about the danger of following the need
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of becoming a science in a naturalistic way. He emphasised that naturalistic science 
requires immobilisation of the object studied. The presumption is interpreted nowa­
days as ethical rather than a methodological one. Kępiński explicitly stressed that the 
psychiatrist adopting the naturalistic methodology takes the freedom from the person 
studied. But he was of opinion that the knowledge on the human being can found 
only when the researcher and his/her object are equal. The even position is, he wrote, 
the only way to come closer to the truth on the human being. The ethics cannot be 
separated in this statement from methodology.
Is psychiatry loosing something essential turning towards biology for scientific 
solution of its problems? The answer depends on understanding the essence of psy­
chiatry. Taking the position declaring psychiatry as the discipline dealing with mental 
disorders, which are perceived as independent beings, touching persons -  possibly not. 
Especially when prevention is left to other disciplines. But psychiatry understood as 
discipline having as subject -  persons suffering from mental disorders rather -  adopt­
ing naturalistic approach deprives itself from ability to see a human being as a person. 
Alanen [14] quoting Fleck on: “...regressive development of reductionistic ideas of 
patient care, leading a view of patients as containers of neurochemical aberrations...” 
probably was of the same opinion. However, this should not be understood as an ap­
peal to stop the biochemical studies. It rather calls for carefulness in generalisations 
of findings of observations in a narrow field.
What are psychiatrists expecting from biology?
Is there anything else psychiatrists turn towards biology for, except methodology? 
Does progress in biology arouse any hopes for psychiatry? Psychiatry never lost the 
strong connection with biology and has been always carrying hopes that discoveries 
within biology will be useful in solving problems of mental disorders. Moreover, all 
meaningful theories in psychiatry, Freud’s psychoanalysis including, are somehow 
related to biology. The reference was the state of knowledge of the brain anatomy and 
functioning. Contemporary psychiatry has never looked for the mind in diaphragm 
but incorporated biological knowledge on the brain as the part of the body responsible 
for mental life. But this concept, by the end of the 20th century was not covering the 
whole biological knowledge on human beings. The reference to the concept of life as a 
self-regulating system [6] required turning attention towards the impact of all systems 
influencing behaviour and experience. The most important are, besides the central ner­
vous system -  the endocrine and immune systems. They all stay in interaction [15].
Psychiatry, as it seems, hopes to find in biological research answers for the key 
questions of the causal factors of mental disorders, their causal treatment and effec­
tive prevention.
So, the most important question psychiatry turns with to biology is the question of 
causal, biological, mechanisms of mental and behavioural disorders.
There are well-motivated reasons to form such a question. Medicine owes biologi­
cal research results finding a causal factor of many disorders. Thanks to them effective 
methods of treatment and prevention have been introduced. The psychiatric success
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with paralysis progressiva, however, has not been followed in spite of extended studies. 
The illustrative example can be that of possibility of relation between viral infection 
in pregnant women and schizophrenia in offspring [16]. This relation is understood as 
infection impact on foetus brain development rather resulting in vulnerability, rather 
then a proof that schizophrenia is an immediate consequence of a viral infection. Nev­
ertheless this interpretation is based on a presumption of a close relation between brain 
functions and mental life, and in consequence mental and behavioural disorders.
It seems to be clear that formulation of the next questions on relations between 
mental and behavioural disorders and the body functions requires new formulations 
on the disorders.
The best example is the American Psychiatric Association solution presented in 
DSM-IV. The most important approaches are postponement of traditional division of 
causal factors of mental disorders (endogenous, psychological and exogenous), and 
as much traditional division of mental disorders into “minor” and “major”. The new 
criterion introduced is suspected dysfunction being a main feature in a group of mental 
and behavioural disturbances. Knowledge on functional anatomy and biochemistry of 
the brain allowed for a hypothesis on causal relation between dysfunction of particular, 
and possible to identify parts and/or systems in the brain and anxiety, disturbance of 
affect, memory or cognition. A large group of research studies carried on in psychiatry 
concerned dysfunction of this kind. New technology has opened possibility to assess a 
size of particular parts of the brain and to study function of the brain with very sophisti­
cated methods of imaging. In addition to post mortem microscopic studies. A reasonable 
body of knowledge comes from studies on animal models of mental functions.
There is yet another group of questions psychiatrists turn with to biology. These 
aim to solve the old problem of genetic transmission of mental disorders. Majority of 
genogramme based studies indicate that the genetic material transmitted from genera­
tion to generation is of importance in genesis of mental disorders. Their results and 
conclusions are based on statistical analysis of differences in prevalence of mental 
disorders in compared groups of identical and non-identieal twins, or siblings, or other 
relatives. There are however studies including both impact of genetic equipment and 
environment on prevalence of mental disorders. Finnish Tiennari [17] study on ad­
opted children of schizophrenic mothers are of the special importance for psychiatry. 
Results of long-term study proved that mother’s disorder was of stronger, than family 
environment, influence on development of schizophrenic disorder in child. Biological 
(including genetic) impact was proved to be stronger in comparison with environmental 
one. The whole problem in the Tiennari study had been conceptualised and formulated 
within the frame of biological methodology. Actually, this is the problem of interac­
tion between nature and nurture in the development of an individual. Or, the problem 
of interaction between genotype and environment in development of phenotype. The 
problem, which is at the moment intensively studied. And, what is especially promis­
ing, the studies are a good example of joint efforts of molecular biologists, clinicians 
and developmental pathologists.
Animal (Rhesus) studies brought results on dependence of expression of the gene 
responsible for serotonine transportation, and the quality of care [18, 19]. Studies on
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alcohol, hazard and substance dependent people brought information of higher fre­
quency of A1 and AIA2 alleles, and lower number of D2 receptors. The findings in 
studies on human populations with eating disorders and borderline personality disorders 
were similar. Prospective studies on effects of infantile (18 people) trauma revealed 
a relation between the consequences and presence of allele A1 [20]. The results can 
be interpreted as indicating the role of early childhood trauma as activating the gene 
whose expression limits the person’s adaptation ability forming vulnerability to stress 
later in life [21]. There are, as it seems, presumptions to formulate a hypotheses that 
inadequate parental care influences penetration of one of the alleles of the gene 5-HTT 
responsible for serotoninergic dysfunction; experience of physical and psychological 
abuse and allele A1 of the gene D2 determinate personality disorder; Post-traumatic 
Disorder in the mother in interaction with dopamine receptor in the baby results in 
dysfunctional attachment causing a mental disorder.
Formative role of early experiences can -  maybe -  be explained by their impact 
of the gene expression. Fonagy quoting Rutter [22] formulated a thesis on significant 
influence of intrapsychic function (determined by conscious and unconscious experi­
ence attributions) on appearance and course of mental disorders.
Fonagy introduces his own concept of Interpersonal Interpretative Mechanisms 
(IIM -  faculty of psychological interpretation, attribution of own and others mental 
states, which is a background of behaviour prediction). According to Fonagy, IIM is 
responsible for “moderation of genetic impact via perception of social environment”. 
The concept may explain why disorders do not appear in spite of evident genetic pre­
disposition. That means it indicates biological ways of beneficial influence of family, 
which was demonstrated in other studies [e.g. 23]. IIM develops within the attachment 
relationship.
Recent research on infant -  mother relationship results indicate a crucial role of 
“good enough attachment” between second and eighteenth months of infant life on 
right hemisphere limbic structures development, and negative impact on the same if 
the attachment relationship fails [24, 25]. These are mainly based on animal model 
studies. Nevertheless they allow for conceptualisation and construction of new models. 
Above all bring new information on the role of early interpersonal experience on the 
brain development.
Studies on patients with brain damage [e.g. 26] and brain imaging in children 
emotionally neglected [27] brought evidence on the role of the preffontal lobe in emo­
tional functioning of human being. Fonagy, using Eric Kedalls reasoning, presented 
an opinion, that the concept explains mechanisms of effective psychosocial preventive 
measures and psychotherapy. Psychosocial environment factors, according to Fonagy 
are potent in changing specific gene expression.
Clinical experience as well as experimental studies have been giving evidence on 
necessity of stimulation for development of functions determined in a genetic way. 
The good example, and well documented is visual function [28].
Research on genetic correlates of mental and behavioural disorders are especially 
interesting in the case of disorders difficult to precise nosological delineation. Be­
havioural disorders appearing specifically in childhood and adolescence and learning
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difficulties in childhood are among such categories. Antisocial behaviour disorder in 
children and adolescents has been understood as determined genetically in the great 
measure, since Robins prospective studies. More sophisticated later studies [29] gave 
evidence, that genetic influence explain behavioural disorder in 63% to 68% depending 
on developmental stage. Moreover a set of correlating genes changes in the course of 
child’s development; only a third part has been found explained by the same genes. 
These results remind about two important things. The first is modesty in interpreta­
tion of empirical data. The other - confirmation of environmental-genetic interaction 
in forming of mind and behaviour.
Two examples reminding the need of researcher modesty
One of the more important concepts within psychoanalytical theory of mental func­
tioning (and mental disorders) is the defence mechanism called suppression. Mental 
experience which is too difficult to be solved, according to psychoanalytical theory, 
becomes actively suppressed to subconsciousness. Results of neuroscience research 
done in the last decade give evidence on subconscious mental life, but quite vary. 
Animal studies proved, that anxiety provoking information does not reach the brain 
parts responsible (according to other studies [30]) for conscious experience. In other 
words -  frightening stimuli arouse regulating brain activity on a subconscious level. 
The same centres however, receive information from those superior brain structures 
whose activity is responsible for consciousness. The results are so exciting that one 
cannot refrain from speculative interpretation. It seems they allow for construction of 
the new vision on consciousness -  subconsciousness relation. Different to that presented 
by Freud. And, of course, quite new conceptualisation of anxiety disorders. But above 
all they confront us with evidence of non-symmetry in functional connections between 
subcortical centres and cortex.
Discovery leads to new questions
Another example is helplessness we feel when trying to explain a complex process 
of art perception. Neuroscience studies on vision [28] gathered enormous amount of 
information on brain functioning in the visual process. Number of centres involved 
in processing when we look at something, as well, as space they occupy in the brain, 
is surprising. The number of narrowly specialised parts of the process is even more 
astonishing. Zeki [28] hypothesised even that modern art such as Mondrian’s abstract 
pictures, Cezanne’s cubist landscapes or Calder’s mobile had been pre-conditioned by 
specific functional brain structures processing simple geometric figures, clear colour 
squares or moving red objects. Nevertheless he was aware the knowledge developed 
till now failed to explain aesthetic experience. Even after taking into account separate 
ways of brain processing of known and unknown visual objects.
There is no evidence to show that a mental disorder is less complex than an aesthetic 
experience. So, if physiology fails to explain our experience in front of Rembrant’s 
“Jewish Bride” we should be modest in expectations that in this way we shall find
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explanation of e.g. depression. So, formulating questions concerning biology of mind
we can expect valuable answers, but still -  at the moment at least -  not conclusive.
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